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Abstract
Scalable secure key distribution is the most important
feature of a scalable secure group communication protocol.
Most of the existing scalable secure group communication
protocols are based on a hierarchical key distribution tree.
These schemes can be classified as hierarchical node based
schemes and hierarchical key based schemes. In this paper;
we compare recently proposed hierarchical key distribution
schemes through simulation using real-life multicast group
membership traces. Our simulations show that hierarchical node based approaches better distribute encryption cost
among the entities of a multicast group. Howevet hierarchical node based schemes “trust” internal nodes of a key
distribution tree. We show that the dual encryption protocol
recently proposed by us overcomes the aforementioned limitation of hierarchical node based schemes, with a marginal
performance penalty.

1. Introduction
Multicasting is a scalable way of transmitting data to
a group of hosts. Several multicast applications, including data streaming applications, collaborative applications
may require secure data transmission [SI. Members of a
multicast session must not be able to access the multicast
data transmitted before their membership has begun or after
their membership has expired. Thus, in dynamic multicast
groups, where members join and leave during the multicast
session, the secret keys need to be updated each time the
membershipchanges. Scalability in this context implies that
the overhead involved in key updates, data transmission and
encryption must be independent of the size of the multicast
group, The other requirement of scalability is that the addition or removal of a host from the group must not affect
all the members of the group. This requirement is called “1
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affects n” scalability problem [6].
Several protocols have been proposed to support scalable
secure multicasting [2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 101. Most of these protocols distribute encryption keys via a distribution tree. We
can classify the tree-based approaches into two groups. The
first class uses a hierarchy of keys [4.8,9, 101 while the second uses a hierarchy of nodes [2, 61 to achieve scalability.
The hierarchical key based schemes suffer from the I affects n scalability problem. Some hierarchical node based
schemes [6] entrust internal nodes of the key-distribution
tree with the distribution of the encryption keys. But they
offer no mechanism to hide secure multicast data from the
internal nodes. We recently proposed a dual encryption protocol (DEP)[2] which provides the capability to deny access
of secure multicast data to third party entities.
In this paper, we compare the en(de)cryption cost at
the sender, members and internal nodes (where applicable)
of the key distribution tree in the hierarchical approaches,
through simulation. In particular, we compare the protocols’ performance as the multicast group sizes increase. We
use real-life multicast traces [ 11 of a few multicast sessions
in the MBone to simulate real world behavior. Our simulations show that hierarchical node based schemes incur less
encryption cost than hierarchical key based schemes. The
node based schemes also better distribute the cost among
the entities of a key distribution tree and their Performance
benefits increase with group size. We show that DEP incurs
only a marginal increase in encryption cost while eliminating the need to trust third parties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we provide a classification of scalable secure multicast protocols used in our comparison study. We characterize the
workload and describe it in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the simulationresults in detail. The final section summarizes
our conclusions.
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2. Classificationof secure multicast protocols
Most of the previous work in the area of secure multicasting has been in key distribution. In a majority of the
proposed scalable key distribution schemes [2,6, 8,9, lo],
the members of the multicast group are part of a tree-like
hierarchical structure. We classify these protocols into hierarchical key based schemes and hierarchical node based
schemes. In hierarchical key based schemes, the sender or
a group manager distributes a set of key encrypting keys
(KEK) to each member, based on the member’s location in
the tree. The sender uses the KEKs to securely send new
KEKs and the session key to members. Hierarchical node
based schemes employ internal nodes of the tree as subgroup
managers (SGM),
which assist in key distribution. These internal nodes may not be members of the multicast group.
SGMs also forward data encryption keys (DEK)received
from the sender, to their subgroup members. While hierarchical node based schemes [6] support distributed group
management, they expose secret keys to the internal nodes,
which may be third party entities.
For our comparison study, we choose one hierarchical
key based scheme, the Centralized Tree-Based Key Management scheme (CTKM) [8, 9, 101, and one hierarchical
node based scheme, Iolus [6]. Since Iolus “trusts” internal
nodes of a key distribution tree, we include DEP [2], which
does not trust the internal nodes, in our comparison. CTKM
has been proposed independently with minor variations by
several research groups. For our study we use the protocol
as described by Wong et. a1 [lo]. We compare the characteristics of the aforementioned protocols in Table 1.
IMS WorM Radio Network Sesslon
I

multicast group size in real-life traces collected from various
multicast sessions’.
The sessions differ in inter-arrival rates of members,
membership durations and popularity of sessions as indicated by the number of simultaneous members in the sessions. Notice that the popularity of a session plays an important role in the multicast key distribution as it governs
the size of the distribution tree. In the rest of the discussion, we use activity in a session and popularity of a session
interchangeably.
NASA STS-71 Session
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Figure 2. Group size in STS-71 session
In the IMS World Radio Network Session the number
of simultaneous members is more than 15 but less than 40
(refer to Figure 1). The session lasted more than a week [I].
The NASA shuttle mission session STS-71 broadcasting the
docking of the Space Shuttle and Space Station Mir over
the MBone [ l ] is a more popular session. For most of the
time the number of simultaneous members is more than one
hundred, and more than three hundred at its peak (shown in
Figure 2). This session lasted more than two weeks.

4. Performance comparison using simulation
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Figure 1. Group size in IMS session

3. Workload characterization
In order to simulate real world behavior, we use real-life
multicast group membership traces collected by Almeroth
e?. a1 [ l ] as our workload. In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the
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In this section we compare the scalable key distribution
approaches through simulation. We develop a simulation
model in C using the CSIM [7] simulation package. In the
model we simulate the join and leave operations following
each of the three key distribution schemes and DEK distribution in case of DEP and Iolus.
Recall that scalable encryption cost is one of the most important requirements of a key distribution scheme. Therefore, we compute the per session encryption cost at the
sender and constitute the comparative study. In case of
CTKM, we build a virtual key distribution tree and use it
as a reference to determine the number of encryptions necessary at the sender during each join or leave. To ensure a
‘For a complete velsion of our study with additional workloads and a
more detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols refer to [3].

1715

Dondeti, Mukherjee & Samal in Proceedings of the Global Telecommunications Conference (1999)

Global Internet Application and Technology

Iolus

CTKM

No. of keys in the multicast group

n+l+l

$9

M

ow

ob)

No. of keys managed by the sender
No. of keys at a member
No. of keys at an SGM

2
3

o(bd

5%

-

4

Public key/ Secret key
Both
Yes
Scalable Encryption Cost
1 affects n scalability
Yes
No. of messages at join
O(1)
No. of messages at leave
O(0
Total key encryptions during data transmission
O(0
No. of key encryptions at the sender
O(1)
Intermediatenodes
Trusted
n: number of members
1: number of subgroups
c: size of the sender's subgroup
1: average size of a subgroup

'

fair comparison, we assume that the SGMs in DEP and Iolus
are third party entities. Thus, in case of DEP all SGMs are
participant SGMs. The sender and the SGMs in DEP and
Iolus incur local subgroup management costs. Additionally,
the senders in DEP and Iolus incur DEK encryption costs,
the SGMs incur DEK translation costs and the members incur DEK decryption costs. The sender in DEP also incurs a
unit cost per join in the session, due to KEK distribution.
Correspondingly each member incurs a one-time unit decryption cost. Finally, each member of a subgroup incurs
a unit decryption cost each time a join or leave occurs in the
subgroup.
In each simulation the number of encryptions andor decryptions performed by the sender the members and the
SGMs were observed. We plot the encryption cost versus
the degree of the key distribution tree for each of the above
three schemes. We analyze those plots in the following.
Each scheme was simulated using the workload described earlier. The performance metrics shown are the join,
leave and the total encryption costs per session at the sender.
In the following we present and discuss the results for each
of these metrics.

4.1. Encryption cost at the sender
The per session encryption overhead at the sender for the
protocols is plotted in Figure 3. The per session join cost
depicts the cost due to joins at the sender's subgroup and
the KEK distribution cost. In the figure the rows represent
the workload used for the simulation, and the columns show
the number of encryptions during join, leave and the total,
respectively.
Observe from Figure 3 (column (i)) that the join cost at
the sender in CTKM decreases very sharply, and then shows
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more smooth decrease. Join cost at the sender in CTKM is
approximately equal to 2(logdn),where d is the degree of
the key distribution tree and n is the group size [ 101. This
expression decreases with increasing degree which explains
the CTKM curves in Figures 3.(i). Figure 3 (column (i))
also indicates that the per session cost at the sender due to
joins increases with degree in DEP and Iolus. The per session join cost at the sender is dependent on the size of the
sender's subgroup, which increases with degree. It also increases with frequency of joins at the sender. The join cost
in DEP also includes the KEK distribution cost which is one
encryption per member in the session. In our simulations,
the join cost per session at the senders in DEP and Iolus was
much lower than the cost at the senders in CTKM. More importantly, the gap between the curves correspondingto DEP
(Iolus) and CTKM widens as the the number of simultaneous members increases. This shows that DEP (Iolus) can
scale very well to multicast sessions with large group sizes.
Figure 3 4 i ) shows that leave cost per session increases
with degree. At low degree, for both workloads leave cost
in CTKM is higher than that in DEP and Iolus. In the IMS
session, for higher values of degree, CTKM performs better than DEP and Iolus. However, DEP and Iolus perform
better than CTKM in STS-71, the more active session. The
per leave encryption cost at the sender in CTKM is approximately d(logd n) whereas in DEP and Iolus it is proportional
to size of the top level subgroup. That explains the increase
in cost as the degree increases. Also in CTKM the sender
is responsible for the key changes during all leaves. while in
DEP and Iolus, the sender changes keys only when its local
subgroup members leave.
Figure 3.(iii) shows the total cost per session. The total cost at the sender during a session in CTKM schemes is
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Figure 3. Encryption cost at the sender during the session
(i) Number of encryptions at the sender due to joins vs. degree
(ii) Number of encryptions at the sender due to leaves vs. degree
(iii) Total number of encryptions at the sender vs. degree
the sum of the cost during joins and leaves. The senders in
DEP and Iolus also incur encryption overhead due to DEK
distribution in addition to the overhead corresponding to the
management of the top level subgroup. For a fair comparison, the DEK in DEP (Iolus) must be changed each time
a join or leave occurs. Thus, we change the DEK approximately as many times as there are joins and leaves, in our
simulations*. Finally, in simulating DEP, we use a single
KEK for the whole group.
Figure 3.(iii) indicates that the total cost at the sender in
CTKM increases with degree after an initial dip. This dip
indicates that the optimal degree of key distribution tree for
CTKM is 4, 5 or 6. The cost in DEP and Iolus increases
with degree. Note that DEK distribution cost is independent
of degree. The increase in cost with degree is due to the
increase in subgroup size at the sender with degree. In the
IMS session (small group size), the cost in DEP and Iolus
was lower than the cost in CTKM for low values of degree.
At higher values of degree, CI'KM performed better than
DEP and Iolus. In the STS-71 session (bigger group size)
the cost per session is significantly lower in DEP and Iolus than that in CTKM for all values of degree. Also, with
increasing group sizes, the gap between the cost curves cor~~

ZNotethat this corresponds to the worst case in DEP (Iolus). Realistically, the sender changes the DEK at a frequency dictated by the security
requirements and performance constraints.
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responding to CTKh4 and DEP (Iolus) increases, showing
that DEP (Iolus) scales better.

4.2. Distribution of en(de)cryption cost
We compute the distribution of total en(de)cryptioncost
at the sender, members and the SGMs in all three schemes
and plot them as percentages in histograms shown in Figure 4. The rows correspond to the workloads while the
columns correspond to CTKM, Iolus and DEP, respectively.
These graphs show that the sender in CTKM incurs a larger
percentage of cost compared to the sender in DEP (Iolus).
This is because DEP distributes the encryption cost between
the sender and the SGMs whereas CTKM burdens the sender
with all the encryption cost.

4.3. Summary
We conclude this section with a summary of our observations in comparing the three scalable secure multicasting
protocols.
0 Hierarchical node based protocols incur less encryption cost compared to hierarchical key based protocols.
They also distribute the cost "evenly" among the entities of a multicast group.
0

Hierarchical node based schemes keep the per member
cost at the sender independent of the multicast group
size, whereas cost in hierarchical key based schemes
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Figure 4. Distribution of en(de)cryption cost
increases with group size. Consequently, Iolus and
DEP scale much better than CTKM as the number of
simultaneous members in a multicast session increases.
0

Unlike in Iolus, DEP can do away with the so called
“trusted” third parties (e.g., participant SGMs) incurring marginally more aggregate cost than Iolus.

5. Conclusion
We compared encryptioddecryption cost incurred in various secure group communication protocols using real-life
group membership data. We conclude that hierarchical node
based approaches fare better than hierarchical key based approaches. The performance advantage of hierarchical node
based approaches increases with the multicast group size.
While most hierarchical node based approaches automatically give access of secure multicast data to third party
hosts which assist in subgroup management, DEP avoids
that drawback using dual encryption. Although DEP incurs marginal increase in cost due to dual encryption, it is
more secure than other hierarchical node based approaches,
while still delivering better performance than hierarchical
key based approaches.
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